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Epistemology Personalized
Matthew A. Benton
Epistemology has focused primarily on propositional knowledge, that
is, on how it is we can know true propositions, where propositions rep-
resent the world as being a certain way, and when true, what is known is
simply that the world is a certain way. Thus what is known is the structure
of the objective world, that is, of some mind-independent truths, where
the paradigm is that of sensory perception. The only kind of knowledge
that would be mind-dependent in any sense would be knowledge of the
contents of someone’s mind. Since it is plausible to think of a mind as
part of the world to be known, and since one cannot know the content of
a mind unless the mind contains that content, both realism and the fac-
tivity of knowledge are upheld even where such truths are in some sense
mind-dependent.
The present essay considers an underexplored area of epistemology,
namely knowledge of persons, and how interpersonal knowledge seems
different from knowledge of propositions. If propositional knowledge is a
state of mind, consisting in a subject’s attitude to a (true) proposition, the
account to be developed here thinks of interpersonal knowledge as a state
of minds, involving a subject’s attitude to another (existing) mind. As shall
be seen, this kind of knowledge exhibits a gradability characteristic of
context-sensitivity, and an analogue of factivity. Yet it also invokes an epis-
temology at odds with certain truisms of propositional epistemology, par-
ticularly with specific formulations of realism and mind-independence.
See especially Williamson (, and : –), and Nagel ().
The early twentieth century realists emphasized, against the idealists, that ‘knowing
makes no difference to what is known,’ and that ‘knowing in no way alters or modifies
the thing known’: see Marion (: –) on the Oxford Realists, citing Cook Wil-
son () and Prichard (: , ). Likewise, they stressed that the object of

Propositional knowledge is arguably distinct in kind from both objec-
tual and interpersonal knowledge. On the account to be developed here,
interpersonal knowledge is had when two subjects know each other per-
sonally, as subjects, from the second-person perspective. It requires that
one have had personal encounters of reciprocal causal contact; that inter-
personal knowledge is symmetric; and that it is not a form of, or reducible
to, propositional knowledge. In § I motivate the distinction between
propositional knowledge and objectual knowledge, of which interpersonal
knowledge is a type. §§– outline three grades of personal involvement,
through which we can more carefully distinguish propositional knowl-
edge about persons from what it is to know someone personally; and I
develop the interesting features of the third grade of involvement which
make for interpersonal knowledge. § applies interpersonal knowing to
several issues in epistemology and social philosophy, especially its role in
understanding evidential position, testimony, and religious epistemology.
Along the way I also consider the relevance of such knowledge for moral
obligations generally, and for our understanding of friendship.
 Knowing Persons, Objects, Propositions
Linguistic data support the broad distinction between objectual and
propositional knowledge, data which serve to isolate, in a prima facie way,
interpersonal knowledge from propositional knowledge about persons.
Our languages encode a difference between propositional and other
kinds of knowledge; and when we find such distinctions widespread
across many languages, this is suggestive of something important to our
cognitive lives. In English this distinction is encoded only grammati-
cally: the construction ‘S knows that φ’ is used to claim propositional
knowledge was not mind-dependent. But interpersonal knowledge as sketched here is
in an important sense mind-dependent, and it crucially does make a difference to what
is known.
Compare Price (: –), Dalmiya (), Matheson (), Stump (: chs.
–), and especially Talbert (); in § I shall note similarities and differences with her
account. For recent developments on second-person relations in philosophy and related
disciplines, see Eilan ().

knowledge, whereas ‘S knows np’, where ‘np’ is a noun phrase such as a
proper name or definite description, can be used to indicate that S knows
personally the person referred to by the noun phrase or name. These
grammatical rules require a well-formed indicative sentence to follow a
‘that’ clause, which expresses the proposition claimed to be known. But
one cannot insert only a noun-phrase or name after such a ‘that’ clause:
in English, for example
() # Susan knows that John.
In contrast to English, many languages have distinct lexical items for
personal knowledge and for propositional knowledge: in Spanish, there
are saber and conocer; in German, kennen and wissen; in French, connaı̂tre
and savoir. This lexical distinction isn’t limited to Indo-European lan-
guages, for similar terms are found in Semitic and Sino-Tibetan lan-
guages. In such languages, one cannot acceptably use the propositional
verb when speaking of knowing a personal acquaintance (or knowing a
city, for example); nor can one acceptably use the acquaintance verb when
speaking of knowledge one has of someone, or some place, with which one
has no first-hand experience.
These distinctions only mark off objectual knowledge from proposi-
tional knowledge, and the thought so far has been that interpersonal
knowledge is a kind of objectual knowledge. But there is additional
evidence that supports a distinctively interpersonal kind of knowledge,
namely, from conjunctive tests of univocal meaning, and from substitu-
tion behaviour with names and definite descriptions.
Of course there is a demonstrative use of such a sentence, which typically intones
on ‘that’: e.g. in a conversation someone might ask if Susan knows John where there is
more than one person named John salient, and upon clarifying which John the asker has
in mind, one could say ‘Susan knows that John’.
For example modern Hebrew (makir and yada), and Chinese (Mandarin and Can-
tonese: rènshi and zhīdao). For discussion of the Polish wiedzieć and znać, see Wierzbicka
(: –) and Goddard (: ).

. Univocality and Conjunction Tests
In linguistics, the possibility of reducing two full statements into an
elided conjunction provides a standard test for semantic sameness: if
you saw a (mammalian) bat, and I saw a baseball bat, we couldn’t express
this with the sentence, ‘We both saw a bat’. Likewise, the sentence
() Jim went to the bank, and Alexa, too.
cannot be used to express the proposition that Jim went to a financial
institution and Alexa went to a riverbank. By contrast,
() Jack knows that the Cubs won and he knows that the Red Sox won.
can be reduced to either of the following
(a) Jack knows that the Cubs and Red Sox won.
(b) Jack knows that the Cubs won, and the Red Sox, too.
which reflects the intuitive idea that knowing that p and knowing that q
entails knowing that: p & q.
However, the two meanings of ‘know’ in () cannot be reduced to (a):
() Hannah knows that penguins waddle, and Ted knows John.
(a) # Hannah knows that penguins waddle, and Ted, John.
For Stanley & Williamson (: –), passing such tests (conjoining embedded
questions and ‘that’ complements under ‘know’) is evidence that knowledge-how is a
form of knowledge-that. See Chomsky (: ) for his original conjunction rule.
Cf. Zwicky & Sadock (: ).
That is, the converse of the Distribution principle given in Hawthorne (: ).
Stanley & Williamson (: –). () and (a) exhibit (attempts at) ‘gapping’ (an
ellipsis rule which permits deletion of an identical verb from one or more clauses to the
right of a clause containing the same verb), whereas (b) exhibits ‘stripping’ (an ellipsis
rule which permits deleting everything in a clause under identity with corresponding
parts of a preceding clause, except for one constituent): see Hankamer & Sag (: –
). Stripping is often regarded as a form of gapping, and gapping as an instance of

Indeed, reduced conjunctions like (a) are not possible in languages like
French that use distinct lexical terms for propositional knowledge and
personal/objectual knowledge, precisely because one lexical item (e.g.
savoir) cannot do double duty for the other (connaı̂tre). These results are
widely recognised to show that the meaning of propositional ‘know[s]’
differs from that of personal/objectual ‘know[s]’.
Yet it has gone unnoticed that similar data is available for distinguish-
ing between subtypes of objectual knowledge. Objectual knowledge in
the broadest sense picks out the knowledge relation of one’s first-hand
familiarity with a field of study, a city, or a person, among others. This
relation is not univocal when it undergoes such conjunction reduction
under the ‘know[s]’ verb. One test, bare argument ellipsis or stripping,
permits reduction by deleting from a later clause all the corresponding
identical parts of a preceding clause, except one constituent:
() Elise knows Boston and Elise knows London.
(a) Elise knows Boston, and London, too.
A similar test is gapping (see fn. ):
() Elise knows Boston and Evan knows London.
(a) Elise knows Boston, and Evan, London.
As we might expect, interpersonal knowledge attribution permits strip-
ping as well as gapping:
() Marge knows John and Marge knows Barry.
(a) Marge knows John, and Barry, too.
conjunction reduction: Hankamer (: ); cf. Jackendoff () for dissent.

() Marge knows John and Helen knows Barry.
(a) Marge knows John, and Helen, Barry.
But stripping and gapping can seem less acceptable when they com-
bine different knowledge relations:
() # Jason knows philosophy, and Boston, too.
() # Duncan knows Edinburgh, and Lisa, physics.
() # Jane knows that the Yankees won, and Tim, too.
(Where the intended reading of () is not that Tim also knows that the
Yankees won, but that Jane also knows Tim.) These examples strongly
suggest that the propositional knowledge relation is distinct from the
personal knowledge relation; they may also suggest distinct subtypes
within the broader objectual knowledge relation. Arguably, stripping
and gapping are not permitted in these conjunction reductions because
they attempt to group different knowledge relations under one verb. At
the very least, positing a distinctive interpersonal knowledge relation
would explain both the acceptability of conjunction reduction in (a) and
(a), as well as the unacceptability of reduction in (a) or (). Note also
that comparative judgements between knowledge relations can sound
unacceptable, especially when one is propositional:
() # Jason knows Boston better than the piano.
() # Elise knows Susan better than that the Yankees won.
All these results suggest that the sense of ‘knows’ invoked by proposi-
tional, objectual, and interpersonal constructions is not univocal.
However the data and the coordination requirements that might be
suggested by them are more complicated than this. For one can acceptably
reduce a conjunction that conjoins objectual knowledge, for example of
a city, with objectual knowledge of a person or group, at least where the

latter is related to the former:
() Walter knows London, and its people.
() Walter knows London, and its Lord Mayor.
So apparently there is not simply a blanket prohibition against coordinat-
ing across types of knowledge. It might be that the examples ()–() are
permitted precisely because the way in which one would gain first-hand
familiarity with one of the objects is regarded as a standard way of also
gaining objectual knowledge of the other: for example, experiencing Lon-
don first-hand is also a way of getting to know its people. On the other
hand, there might be pragmatic constraints of a Gricean sort that explain
why some conjunction reductions are unacceptable. As such, any broader
lessons to be drawn from the above data about individuating the full range
of knowledge relations will have to be tentative at best.
. Substitution Behaviour
Though the conjunction reduction tests above are merely suggestive, a dif-
ference in the substitution behaviour of propositional and interpersonal
knowledge ascriptions is more decisive.
First, note that the ‘S knows np’ construction can take a propositional
use and an interpersonal use. When used with a name (e.g. ‘R’), ‘S
knows R’ is often used as short-hand for ‘S knows of R’ or ‘S knows who
R is’. These constructions pick out S’s propositional knowledge about
R by which S might identify or describe R, for example in answer to
the question ‘Who is R?’ Accordingly, this use of ‘S knows R’ ascribes
‘knowledge-wh’, where the ‘-wh’ complement embeds a question; it thus
ascribes propositional knowledge, and can be distinguished from the
interpersonal-acquaintance sense of knowledge, which does not embed
such questions (see Stanley : –). This is supported by the fact
As in: ‘I know Smith, he’s the guy who... but I don’t know him personally.’
Such propositions known about R can be flagged by what Donnellan (: §)
called the referential use of a definite description in an assertion.

that one can claim knowledge-who while disavowing interpersonal
knowledge:
() I know who Rebecca is, but I don’t know her personally.
() I know of Rebecca, but I don’t know her.
Similarly, with knowledge-wh: you might know Paris (by experience) but
not know which is the largest city in France; conversely, you might know
which city is the largest in France without knowing it from experience.
Differences in substitution behaviour emerge from comparing propo-
sitional knowledge characteristic of knowledge-who with interpersonal
knowledge. The interpersonal knowledge relation plausibly preserves
truth under substitution of co-referential terms. Taking ‘knowsi ’ to stand
for interpersonal knowledge: if Lisa knowsi Will, and Will = Liam, then
Lisa also knowsi Liam (though she may not know that he is called Liam).
But the propositional knowledge underlying knowledge-who does not
work this way. If Lisa knows who Will is, and Will = Liam, it does not
follow that Lisa also knows who Liam is: the propositional knowledge by
which Lisa knows how to identify Will won’t suffice for her to identify
Liam unless Lisa also knows that Will = Liam.
Similar results ensue with definite descriptions. If Mark knowsi Sue,
and Sue is the department chair, then Mark knowsi the department chair,
even if Mark is unaware that Sue is the department chair. But the propo-
sitional knowledge of knowledge-who does not preserve truth under sub-
stitution: if Mark knows who Sue is, and Sue is the department chair, then
it does not follow that Mark knows who is the department chair.
The data from substitution behavior distinguish propositional
knowledge-who (and knowledge-of) from interpersonal knowledge. The
latter is not easily reducible to propositional knowledge, nor to some kind
of ‘qualitative’ knowledge of ‘what it is like’: sentences such as
Hintikka (: –) seems to ignore this distinction, though he acknowledges
that ‘first-hand knowledge of people and things’... ‘is much less clearly defined than the
framework created by one’s perceptual point of view or one’s personal memories.’

() She knows many people.
() She knows him.
appear (on their default reading) to predicate an interpersonal knowledge
of others, which does not seem like the relation of propositional knowl-
edge or knowledge of some qualitative experience.
Thus the ‘S knows np’ construction can refer to either facts known
about a person (knowledge-who or knowledge-of), or to the relation of
knowing someone personally. Similarly, some of what we often call ‘per-
sonal knowledge’ consists simply in propositions known about persons;
whereas other knowledge referred to by that phrase is distinctively non-
propositional because interpersonal. Because of this ambiguity, we must
distinguish three grades of personal involvement in order to isolate the
interpersonal knowledge of interest here.
 Three Grades of Personal Involvement
The first and second grades of personal involvement delineated in what
follows are ways of acquiring propositional knowledge about a person.
Though the third grade of involvement is also a way to acquire propo-
sitional knowledge about someone, it makes available something more:
interpersonal knowledge, which itself is arguably irreducible to proposi-
tional knowledge.
Some—call them ‘intellectualists’—may object that personal knowing just reduces
to propositional knowledge of a certain kind, and may insist that the personal ‘know[s]’
construction applies only when one has propositional knowledge of a particular kind, or
gained a particular way. Against this, note that such an intellectualist will need to explain
why the standard semantic tests (conjunction reduction and the substitution behaviour
from §) differentiate between the two constructions if they both refer to propositional
knowledge. These tests reveal distinct syntactic constraints on propositional ‘know’ and
personal ‘know’, which is the opposite of what we would expect if they both referred
to propositional knowledge. Additionally, the intellectualist will need to explain what
seems to have been lost in the amnesiac, death, and biographer cases considered in §
below. For these reasons, I regard the intellectualist line to be unpromising.

The first grade of personal involvement is achieved by having propo-
sitional knowledge of facts about a person, gained without first-hand ex-
perience of the person. § mentioned first-hand familiarity with a person
or a city; I shall say that an experience (of a personal subject, or of some
perceptual object) is first-hand only if it is of the subject/object itself, and
thus not mediated by transmission through another mind. Propositional
knowledge about someone that is not first-hand is usually gained second-
hand, by testimonial chains, from others: thus one can know ‘by descrip-
tion’ all manner of facts about someone through, say, reading newspapers
or hearing about them from friends, rather than first-hand by interact-
ing with the person themself. One typically learns the names and roles
of many people in this second-handed way. Thus first grade knowing
about someone is propositional knowledge of facts about them, acquired
by some other method (typically testimony) than first-hand experience of
the person.
The second grade of personal involvement is had when one gains propo-
sitional knowledge about a person through perceptual access to the person
(though it need not be perception of the person ‘in the flesh’). Such facts
are learned first-hand, and the causal direction is one-way, from the per-
son to the knower. Various types of knowledge are available in this sec-
ond grade: objectual, qualitative, as well as propositional knowledge. Of
course, one can acquire a kind of objectual knowledge by perceiving a
person, just as one can acquire a kind of objectual knowledge by perceiv-
ing an object (and this may bring with it some qualitative knowledge of
what a person or object looks like). But one can plausibly acquire either
of these without thereby gaining propositional knowledge about the ob-
ject. For example, visually, one can see a maple tree without seeing that
it is a maple tree (Dretske : ch. ). Given this distinction between
objectual seeing and propositional seeing, being perceptually related to
Nor mediated by explicit inference of the kind used in existential instantiation. For
one could gain knowledge by description in a way that is neither first-hand nor second-
hand: if you let ‘Tom’ name the world’s tallest person, you can know, based on induction,
that Tom is over  feet tall, though you presumably have never been in causal contact
with Tom (cf. a case considered by Strawson : ch. ). Though this technically falls
under our first grade, because this knowledge seems uninteresting I shall ignore it here.

objects can give one a primitive kind of objectual knowledge through per-
ceptual acquaintance, particularly if one can commit the qualitative ex-
perience to (episodic) memory. In the same way, one might have objec-
tual knowledge of persons which does not yield propositional knowledge
about them; but one might also learn a lot of propositions about someone
through perceiving them. Our main interest in this second grade is the
acquisition of propositional knowledge about someone through perceptual
access to them.
Neither of the first two grades of personal involvement suffice for
knowing someone personally. Consider the following case: Juan and
Julia go to the same large committee meetings over many years. They
know each other’s names and institutional roles, and know many other
facts about each other; but they know all this from other sources, or by
overhearing conversations each is having with other people. They hear
each other offer suggestions in meetings, but they’ve never addressed each
other individually in conversation. They have much first and second grade
knowledge (propositional, qualitative, objectual) of each other. But intu-
itively, Julia and Juan do not know each other personally.
Thus the third grade of personal involvement requires treating another
subject as a subject, that is, as an ‘I’ treats as an individual ‘you’. To en-
ter the third-grade of involvement, there must minimally be at least one
subject treating the other as another subject, and thus there can be one-
sided third-grade involvement without it rising to the level of knowing
each other interpersonally. The paradigm case of such involvement, how-
ever, is first-hand and distinctively interpersonal, where each treats the
other as a subject with the aim of reciprocation. Because of these recip-
rocal interactions, interpersonal knowledge is plausibly a state of minds,
Compare Campbell (), Martin (; ), and Brewer () on percep-
tual acquaintance. In the terms of Russell’s early taxonomy, objectual knowledge (and
something like interpersonal knowledge as distinguished below) would be knowledge of
things had directly by acquaintance (Russell  []: –; cf. also ), where the
‘thing’ is another mind.
Some might be inclined to ascribe one-sided third-grade treatment as enabling
someone to know another ‘personally’; but I regard these ascriptions as faulty, and par-
asitic on features of genuinely interpersonal knowing where the paradigm is reciprocal
third-grade involvement.

requiring engagement with another subject as a subject. We refer to such
knowledge when we talk of knowing someone ‘personally’.
Interpersonal knowledge is autonomous relative to any particular
propositions known about a person, in this sense: for any set of propo-
sitions one knows about someone, one could know that someone inter-
personally without knowing those propositions about them. And inter-
personal knowledge is distinguished from the first and second grades of
personal (propositional) knowledge in that the former requires that the
causal route is two-way, running both directions between subjects. While
second grade involvement might include two-way perceptual interactions
(as in the case of Juan and Julia), to create interpersonal knowledge this
two-way causal interaction must be undertaken from the second-person
perspective: minimally, this second-person stance involves each person
treating the other as a subject, for example in the language of address, or
in joint attention to objects or topics of conversation.
Whereas we noted above that one might acquire objectual knowledge
of someone by standing in a perceptual relation to their mind (and thereby
be able to gain propositional knowledge characteristic of the second grade
of involvement), to have interpersonal knowledge those perceptual re-
lations must run both ways between minds who each adopt a second-
personal perspective toward one another. When I speak of interpersonal
knowledge, I have both directions of this third grade in mind.
In the spirit of Russell’s ‘direct acquaintance,’ Sosa notes that knowing
a person requires an acquaintance-like perceptual contact:
Knowing someone or something, knowing some ‘object’ in the
broadest sense of this term, seems at least sometimes to require
Moreover, one could know any set of propositions about someone without knowing
them personally. Consistent with all this, interpersonal knowing might always bring
with it some propositional, qualitative, or objectual knowledge.
For second-personal approaches, see Eilan (), Lavin (), Longworth (),
and Salje (forthcoming). For work on joint attention and mirror neurons in the perception
of other minds, see Eilan et al. (), Stump (: ch. ), and Green (), among
others.
Note that Price’s (: –) and Stump’s (: ch. ) accounts of personal know-
ing are not fine-grained enough to distinguish between the Juan/Julia case above and
those who meet this third grade of personal involvement.

some kind of special causal interaction with that ‘object’. This
is plausibly a requirement for knowing a person, and for know-
ing an experience or a sight, say the sight of the Boston skyline
two miles from the south on highway , or the experience of
a cold shower after a hard run.
Borrowing from these ideas, I shall say that one is interpersonally ac-
quainted with other persons by learning facts from them first-hand: when
one knows another interpersonally, at least some learning about them oc-
curs second-personally, in ‘I–you’ subject-to-subject interaction. When in-
terpersonal, some of what one learns about others is learned from, because
it is given to one by, the persons themselves. As Talbert puts it in her own
account, ‘the other must consent to be known’ (Talbert : ). By in-
teracting in this way with other persons, we stand in perceptual acquain-
tance relations with their minds, even though such personal interactions
are of course mediated by sense-perception, inference, and so on. Thus
‘directness’ is reconstrued as resulting from subject-to-subject (typically
face-to-face) encounters, which as noted earlier, are first-hand in the sense
that the experiencing of another’s mind is not mediated by transmission
through someone else’s mind. Thus interpersonal knowledge’s acquain-
tance cannot be had at second-hand, for that would be a way of indirectly
knowing propositions about a person, rather than a way of knowing some-
one personally.
 Knowing One Another
On the account sketched so far, interpersonal knowledge is a state of
minds, requiring second-personal encounter(s) with someone. These
conditions are captured by the following necessary conditions, where
‘knowsi ’ abbreviates ‘interpersonally knows’:
BonJour & Sosa (: ).
Craig (: ff.), and Matheson (: ff.) criticize direct, ‘acquaintance-
like’ perceptual requirements for knowing persons. Because I do not require in the flesh
perceptual contact for my account, such criticisms do not apply.

Encounter: S knowsi R only if (i) S has had reciprocal causal
contact with R, in which (ii) S treats R second-personally, and
(iii) R treats S second-personally.
I noted earlier that interactions taken from the second-person perspective
minimally involve treating another as a subject, for example in the lan-
guage of address or in joint attention to topics of conversation or to objects
in the vicinity. More specifically, I shall say that a treatment by a subject
S toward its recipient R is second-personal in virtue of S treating R as a
subject (that is, with the intentional stance as an ‘I’ toward an individual
agent as a singular ‘you’) where: S offers to R some of S’s own thoughts,
words, attitudes, or emotions, and S is or for the most part intends to be
attentive to R’s thoughts, words, attitudes, or emotions which might be
given (to S as ‘you’) in return. Such contact between them is reciprocal
insofar as each shares with the other some of their own thoughts, words,
attitudes, or emotions in response to the other. We might say that such re-
ciprocal encounters bring the mind of the known subject itself right into
the subjective life of the knower’s mind, and thus their occasion for in-
terpersonal knowing is, as our gloss has it, a state of minds meeting.
It will be helpful to compare briefly the present account with Talbert’s
() second-person framework for knowing others. For Talbert, such
interactions are constituted by ‘shared worlds’ and shared interactions
between two persons, where the breadth and depth of such interactions
contribute to how well they know each other. Talbert’s notion of ‘second-
person knowledge’ is irreducible to propositional knowledge given its de-
pendence on each subject’s skill, which develops into an individualized
knowledge-how, that is, knowledge of how to interact with particular per-
sons, deployed in the service of experiencing both their mind and sharing
experiences along with that mind. My account emphasizes many similar
As noted earlier, we can allow for one-sided third-grade of involvement, correspond-
ing to when a subject S treats R second-personally, but R either does not even receive it
as such, or R does not reciprocate such treatment to S; thus a case where (ii) holds but
not (iii). While we can allow for this possibility, such a one-sided interaction will not rise
to the level of involvement needed to achieve interpersonal knowledge.
To borrow Campbell’s phrase: Campbell (: ); cf. also Campbell ().

features, though I prefer to locate the irreducibility of interpersonal know-
ing in the two-way interactions characteristic of two subjects treating each
other as subjects. In addition, as we shall see below, Talbert’s four con-
ditions target a different phenomenon—knowing someone well—whereas
our present aim is an account of the minimal conditions required to gain
interpersonal knowledge at all (a phenomenon which Talbert does not ex-
plicitly consider). Finally, it is unclear that her four conditions for the
interactions needed to know some one well are able to deliver the judge-
ment that Juan and Julia, in the case considered in the last section, fail to
know each other personally.
Encounter’s clauses (ii) and (iii) capture why distant spies or stalk-
ers would not count as knowing their target personally, even though they
may acquire much (second grade) propositional knowledge about them:
though they may have second-grade knowledge of the person, they will
not (if distant) be treating their target second-personally, nor will their
targets so treat them. Compare also a biographer, who learns many facts
about the person she is researching. We can suppose that in principle such
a biographer could come to know more propositions about him than even
he himself knew. Yet this biographer would not, given just that proposi-
tional knowledge, counting as knowing him personally; indeed, if he is
dead and they never could have met, she would agree that she lacks an
important kind of knowledge about him. The reason why is that none of
Encounter’s three clauses are fulfilled.
Encounter’s clause (i) is not redundant given (ii) and (iii), because the
latter conditions can be met without fulfilling the former. Suppose that
Maud writes a letter to someone, Jim, whom she has never met or inter-
acted with. Coincidentally, Jim also writes a letter to Maud. But neither
letter is received by the other (perhaps this is repeated, with letters never
being received). Arguably clauses (ii) and (iii) are fulfilled, but not (i); and
intuitively, they do not yet know each other personally. Relatedly for the
In part because I want to remain neutral here on the reducibility of know-how to
knowledge-that. See e.g. Stanley .
This judgement remains intuitive if each letter is received and read, but neither
Jim nor Maud respond to the other’s letter. Notice that becoming acquainted with a
fictional character by reading a novel involves a kind of contact with both the ‘mind’ of

case of an intercepted letter: if Peter receives Maud’s letter addressed to
and intended for Jim, he does not thereby come to know Maud personally,
nor does Maud come to know Peter personally (mutatis mutandis for, say,
a conversational eavesdropper). In this case, none of clauses (i)–(iii) are
fulfilled. In short, fulfilling Encounter ensures that the causal contact
is reciprocal and taken up under second-personal terms.
Such encounters can be technologically mediated, and still be ‘meet-
ings of the minds’ in our first-hand sense. Thus two people could
interpersonally know each other entirely as pen pals or phone pals or chat
room pals, though in these extreme cases, they would lack a standardly
available knowledge-who: they would not visually recognise one another
(except by sharing pictures), nor would they have qualitative knowledge
of mannerisms, facial expressions, mood patterns, and so on. For
mature subjects, interpersonal knowledge typically brings with it at least
some knowledge-who by which the known person can be individuated,
and once had, at least some of this knowledge-who must be retained in
order to keep knowing interpersonally. This pragmatic fact can explain
why it sounds strange to claim interpersonal knowledge in the present
tense but effectively disavow (all salient) knowledge-who, as in:
() # I know Robert personally, but I don’t know who he is.
the character, plus the mind of the author; but there is no reciprocation, nor (I take it)
does the reader treat the character or author second-personally, and thus Encounter is
failed. Contrast Stump’s (: chs. –) account, which allows one to know (personally)
a fictional character.
What about the case of a speaker/lecturer to a large group? The speaker takes a
broader second-person (plural) perspective toward other persons, but the attentiveness
and reciprocation from the audience (even if there is Q&A) is minimal and when present,
it is very one-sided; and so arguably, in some cases, either clause (i) or (iii) (or both) are
not fulfilled.
For more, see Talbert ().
In such cases, a version of () might be apt to convey that one lacks a particularly
salient kind of knowledge-who.
Of course, having isolated a relevant kind of knowledge-who, one can make similar
disavowals. This is especially clear in the past tense: ‘I knew Robert personally, but I
didn’t know who he was [the famous actor]’. Thanks to Tim Williamson here.

Thus in typical cases, interpersonal knowing brings with it a great stock
of qualitative knowledge and knowledge-who, and normally enough such
that each subject will recognise that they’ve had the personal encounters
which make possible their interpersonal knowing. But any mutual recog-
nition of this is not itself necessary for interpersonal knowledge.
The encounters which enable one (for the near future) to have in-
terpersonal knowledge also enable one to get to know someone more
fully. One can know someone more or less well, and thus interpersonal
knowledge is gradable, admitting of degrees. This gradability makes for
third-person comparative judgements, whose default reading tends to be
that of interpersonal knowledge rather than propositional knowledge:
() John knows Sue better than Rachel does. (Stanley : )
Thus one can know someone more intimately not just by adding to one’s
stock of propositional knowledge about him or her, but by having more
personal contact with them, by sharing experiences. As a result, there
plausibly is a context-sensitive threshold for how well S knows R, or how
often S and R have had personal interactions, in order for S to count, in a
given context, as knowing R personally. In some contexts knowing some-
one interpersonally requires more than just having met once: one will
have had face-to-face personal contact on several occasions in the not too
distant past. But in other contexts, even when one hasn’t met someone
multiple times, one can in principle still count as knowing someone: ‘Do
you know R?’ ‘Yes, I just met her for the first time yesterday.’ And in still
other contexts, where the interpersonal knowledge attributed is of some-
one who has celebrity status or is otherwise very busy, the standard for
I want to allow that, for example, infants can personally know their caregivers, even
though they presumably lack the propositional recognition typical of more mature sub-
jects. For related work on joint attention in infants, see Roessler (); for the idea that
pre-linguistic children can engage in distinctively second-personal ways of interacting,
see Heal (: ). Contrast Matheson (: ), whose account has it that knowing
personally requires that the known person be aware (know) that she has communicated
personal information about herself to the knower.
For if one hasn’t seen or talked to someone one knew for many years, then at some
point she is someone that one merely ‘once knew’.

what it takes to know them can be raised quite high: for example, one
may not count as knowing Barack Obama personally simply by having
met and interacted with him several times. Because my main interest here
is in specifying the minimal conditions on knowing someone personally, I
shall set aside the issue of what more might be needed to know someone
well (for an apt account, see Talbert : –).
Through personal encounters, people can progress from being mere
acquaintances to being friends, to close friends, to intimates or lovers.
Progressing through such stages would be difficult without personal
contact of the kind envisioned. Increase in personal encounters, once
there are enough of them, make for interpersonal knowing. And
arguably one must continue to have enough recurring encounters over
time in order to keep knowing someone personally (indeed, as shown by
Talbert (: f.), knowing someone well plausibly requires a certain
breadth and depth of interactions). Given the importance of such two-way
interactions, interpersonal knowledge is plausibly also symmetric:
Symmetry: S knowsi R only if R knowsi S.
S’s knowing R interpersonally requires that R also interpersonally know
S. Symmetry does not require that persons know one another on the same
levels of intimacy: S might know R much better than R knows S, but this
may not affect the fact that they do know one another interpersonally.
There are diachronic difficulties concerning when interpersonal knowl-
edge begins and ends; so far we have only considered necessary condi-
tions on interpersonal knowing, where retaining interpersonal knowledge
requires retaining at least some propositional, qualitative, or objectual
knowledge gained about the subject. Yet sufficient conditions for inter-
personal knowing might be impossible to come by. Here I only note that
Symmetry is committed to the interpersonal knowledge between S and R
being lost for both if it is lost for one.
This seems to get right cases of amnesia, where R remembers nothing
Saying how much is enough is a vexed matter (compare propositional knowledge
and how much evidence/justification it takes).

(having lost all qualitative and propositional knowledge) of S, but where S
still has a lot of propositional knowledge about R. In such cases, it is plau-
sible to say that S no longer knows R interpersonally, but retains most
of his propositional knowledge about R, including how S had come to
know R personally through various first-hand interactions. It also rightly
predicts cases of death: we no longer know a dead subject interperson-
ally, thus we shift to the past tense with interpersonal ‘know’ (‘I knew
her well’), though not for propositional ‘know’ (‘I know that she loved
cats’). Thus Symmetry also captures a condition that mimics the factivity
of propositional knowledge: to know another interpersonally, there must
be a mind there to be known. Finally, Symmetry is supported by the
way that interpersonal knowledge ascriptions standardly license various
inferences. For example, self-ascribing interpersonal knowledge typically
licenses the inference that they also know you; nor is the inference ob-
viously cancellable: ‘I know Beth, but she doesn’t know me.’ Moreover,
common social expectations suggest that a speaker will rightly hesitate to
claim to know someone if she suspects that they would not themselves
affirm that they know her. Because she is liable to mislead her conversa-
tional partners by claiming to know that person, her hesitation is plausibly
due to the standard inference available to them that the person in question
would also know her.
One might worry that the prospects for acquiring interpersonal knowl-
edge are threatened under conditions of deception, though neither En-
counter nor Symmetry rule this out. Suppose that through many per-
sonal encounters Conrad, a conman, is constantly misrepresenting him-
self to Beatrice. Beatrice has adopted many beliefs about Conrad, most
of which are false. On the one hand, it might seem that Beatrice doesn’t
really know Conrad at all. Yet on the other hand, it seems that Beatrice
still knows someone interpersonally (namely Conrad), even when Beatrice
learns that it is a manipulated relationship built upon deceit; I think we
should accept this latter line. The judgement that Conrad knows Beatrice
Note that this feature of my view differs from Stump’s view of Franciscan knowledge,
for on her view one can know (personally) deceased individuals and fictional characters
(Stump : ).

personally while Beatrice does not know Conrad personally is plausibly
driven by the disproportionate amount of propositional knowledge which
Conrad has of Beatrice but which Beatrice in turn lacks for Conrad. It
also might track the fact that Beatrice meets some sincerity conditions for
Conrad to know her well (see Talbert’s sincerity condition: : ), but
not vice versa. If so, the conman case suggests that one can gain and re-
tain interpersonal knowledge even without gaining (much) propositional
knowledge of the subject; whereas the amnesiac and death cases suggest
that one can retain all one’s propositional knowledge of a subject while
losing one’s interpersonal knowledge of them.
The moral dimensions raised by the conman case can lead us to con-
sider other cases bearing on moral philosophy more generally; but instead
of allowing moral judgements to affect whether there is interpersonal
knowledge, we may ask whether interpersonal knowing can affect moral
judgements. For example, arguably the presence or absence of interper-
sonal knowledge can illuminate the widespread ethical intuition that we
often have (defeasibly) stronger moral obligations to those we know and
are close to than to others. If knowing someone personally involves hav-
ing a minimal level of acquaintance and familiarity with that person, this
may generate obligations owing to that knowledge. Indeed, such knowl-
edge could be pressed into service for those who find second-personal re-
lations to be central to moral obligation. At the very least, personal en-
counters can have a positive impact on our moral behaviour toward those
individuals: some empirical findings suggest that eye-contact character-
Arguably the conman case only causes a problem for an account which takes Symme-
try and Encounter to be jointly sufficient conditions for interpersonal knowledge, and
I have not argued for their sufficiency. (Indeed, I suspect that adequate necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions are, as in much of philosophy, too difficult to come by.)
Recall that intellectualists (like Matheson ) who think of interpersonal know-
ing as reducible to having enough propositional knowledge gained in a certain way (e.g.
through personal encounters) will have to offer a rival explanation of (i) why the lin-
guistic data exhibit substitution differences between knowledge-who and interpersonal
knowledge, and (ii) what seems lost or missing in the amnesiac, death, and biographer
cases considered above. Whether it would be a better explanation of these than the ac-
count offered here, I will leave to others to judge.
See e.g. Unger (: ch. ) and Kamm (: chs. –).
E.g. Darwall (; a; b).

istic of Encounter and our third grade of personal involvement leads
to more civil and moral behaviour toward those individuals, compared
with merely knowing someone’s name (knowledge-who typical of our first
grade) or with seeing the person (characteristic of our second grade of per-
sonal involvement). Whether or not we do in fact have stronger moral
obligations toward individuals we know personally, marshalling an ac-
count of interpersonal knowledge promises to shed some light on why
one might act more appropriately toward, or feel that one has stronger
obligations towards, those personally known.
 Further Applications
The last section briefly sketched some ways that an account of interper-
sonal knowledge might contribute to moral philosophy. Its contribution
to everyday areas of our social lives is perhaps obvious. Here I shall
consider its role in epistemology and social philosophy, in particular, to
debates over evidence, friendship, religious epistemology, and testimony.
If interpersonal knowledge is as sketched above, then some knowledge
which is not knowledge of propositions can nevertheless figure in a sup-
port relation and can interact with propositional evidence. The general
idea is this. When one knows another interpersonally, one can be entitled
to trust or rely on that person in some ways, not simply because one has
evidence that the person is trustworthy or reliable with respect to some
(or any) domain, but solely because one has a certain kind of relationship
with that person. Alternatively, when one knows someone interpersonally,
one may be entitled to distrust or eschew reliance on that person, not be-
cause one possesses particular evidence that the person is untrustworthy
or unreliable with respect to some domain, but solely because one knows
this person by way of personal interactions.
In a study amongst strangers in online communications: Lapidot-Lefler & Barack
().
E.g. interpersonal knowledge (past or present) plays an important role in perhaps
the most famous results in sociology: see Granovetter (: , incl. n. ).
I shall assume, for the moment, that evidence is propositional; cf. Williamson (:
ch. ) and Dougherty ().

This idea can be made more vivid thus. Suppose two people, Jill and
Sam, can have the same evidence (let’s say, they each know propositions
p–pn) bearing on Tom’s expressed commitment to φ at (about) time t and
his reliability in following through on his word. Let us say that this evi-
dence justifies Jill and Sam to the same degree in believing that Tom will
φ at around t (or if one prefers, it justifies the same credence). Suppose
that t rolls around and Jill and Sam realize that Tom has not yet φ’d. If
Jill knows Tom personally, this knowledge can make Jill both rational and
justified in continuing to believe (or retain the same credence), at least for
some appropriate length of time, that Tom will nevertheless fulfil his com-
mitment to φ (especially if we suppose that Tom’s commitment was to Jill
that he would φ). By contrast, if Sam does not know Tom personally, Sam
will not be rational and justified in continuing to believe (retain her cre-
dence), for the same duration as Jill, that Tom will fulfil his commitment
to φ. That is, even though they have the same evidence (p–pn) bearing
on Tom’s commitment and reliability concerning his φ-ing, there will
be some later time t at which Jill but not Sam will be rational and jus-
tified in continuing to believe, despite the mounting evidence that Tom
has shirked his commitment. But if so, then (propositional) evidence
isn’t the only justifier of belief; interpersonal knowledge can play such
a role, just as it may play a role in facilitating or hindering the acquisi-
tion of propositional knowledge. (I shall also consider a testimony case
shortly.) And to the extent that interpersonal knowledge is crucial to the
above case, it also promises to shed light on the parallel issue of epistemic
partiality in friendship (see Keller , Stroud , and Lackey unpub):
if one can be entitled to believe in or trust a friend in some matter beyond
what the evidence on its own makes rational, this will likely be in part
because interpersonal knowledge is playing a crucial role.
For those who doubt the possibility that Jill and Sam could both know p–pn while
only Jill (and not Sam) knows Tom interpersonally, note that Sam could learn p–pn
through Jill’s testimony that: p–pn.
Notice how appealing to interpersonal knowledge can adequately answer questions
about epistemic credentials in such cases. Jill can respond to the question (perhaps posed
by Sam), ‘Why, under these circumstances, do you continue to believe Tom will φ?’ with
‘Because I know Tom’. Likewise, Sam can justify her failing to believe (or her reduced
credence) that Tom will come through by citing that she does not know Tom personally.

One might doubt that in the above case Jill really is better off in any
distinctively epistemic way than Sam, given that they possess the same
propositional knowledge relevant to whether Tom will keep his commit-
ment. And one might doubt this even while agreeing that there is some
sense in which Jill is more entitled to think that Tom will keep his commit-
ment. Why should we suppose that if Jill is more entitled, in some sense,
to think so, that this is because the factor in play (namely interpersonal
knowledge) is of some epistemic import? Here is a reason to think that the
factor is indeed epistemically significant. In some situations we rightly
care about whether a person has had direct perceptual acquaintance with
the facts or with some event, and the kind of qualitative support which
that gives to the person puts them in an epistemically stronger position.
Consider cases concerning isolated second-hand knowledge: one knows
some proposition yet didn’t learn it first-hand, but rather second-hand by
way of testimony. In such cases, we often judge that though the person
indeed knows, she is not as strongly situated as the first-hand knower to
assert or act (properly) upon that knowledge (see Lackey  and Ben-
ton ). Similarly, in criminal court cases a lawyer will prefer to call
an eye-witness, who can claim to have seen someone at a crime scene; or
a character witness, who knows personally an accused individual. What
these witnesses have in common is first-hand acquaintance (either percep-
tual or interpersonal) with the individual in question; the lawyer would be
far less interested in someone who knows all the same facts about an event
or an individual but knows them entirely by learning such facts from an-
other’s say-so. Our preferences about these cases suggest that it matters
how one knows what or whom one knows, where the mode of learning—
first-hand—is less subject to doubt or memory failure. Clearly then,
first-hand acquaintance is valued by us in large part because it improves
the knower’s epistemic position. Since much of what is distinctive about
interpersonal knowing is the first-hand manner of interpersonal involve-
ment with another subject, we should expect that it is Jill’s interpersonal
It also may bring with it additional richness of content that can be the source of
further recollection or identification: e.g. the qualitative knowledge needed to identify
someone from a police lineup.

knowledge of Tom which makes her more entitled to think he will come
through. Knowledge, not just of propositions but of persons, can enhance
one’s epistemic position; but this is unsurprising, since knowledge can
have epistemic effects.
Can the view offered here, that interpersonal knowledge can some-
times play a role akin to that of evidence, be squared with the spirit of
Williamson’s E=K thesis, that one’s evidence is all and only one’s knowl-
edge? In the above case, Jill and Sam possess the same propositional
evidence, but possess different knowledge. One can perhaps retain the
spirit of E=K, given that interpersonal knowledge is a kind of knowledge;
thus if E=K, even (non-propositional) knowledge can serve as evidence,
particularly if it entails certain propositions (in our case, knowingi
R entails that R exists). Going this revisionary route would require
dropping the claim that all evidence is propositional (Williamson :
ff.), in favour of the claim that all evidence is knowledge; thus the
schematic argument for E=K would instead be (where the first premise
would require supplementary argument):
All evidence is knowledge.
All knowledge is evidence.
——————————
All and only knowledge is evidence.
Even if one balks at this route, because as non-propositional, such knowl-
edge is ill-suited to enter into evidential probability relations, there re-
mains an indirect way it could contribute to one’s evidential standing:
when one has knowledge that one has interpersonal knowledge, this
known proposition can presumably play the relevant evidential role.
A similar theme concerning evidence and interpersonal knowledge has
occasionally been appealed to in religious epistemology. If God exists
No doubt there is more to be said here about the conditions that justify trust over
mistrust; but my focus here is on the epistemological side of these matters.
See Kierkegaard ( []: –), James (: , ), Mitchell (in Flew
and MacIntyre : –), Mitchell : ), Lewis (; see Wielenberg :
ff. for discussion), Rawls ( []: – and ff.), and esp. Stump (),

and one can (in some relevant way) know God as a personal subject, then
this will affect how the believer ought to respond to the general problem of
divine hiddenness, or to other specific evidence suggesting that God does
not exist, does not love her, or has abandoned God’s promises. If inter-
personal knowledge between subjects matters in a distinctively epistemic
way to evidence that bears on that relationship, this may sanction a kind
of dogmatism or steadfastness in the face of contrary evidence; but in the
envisioned case, that sanction is provided not only by what, but by whom,
one knows. Note also the sceptical scenario concerning the existence of
God: even if God exists and one knows God interpersonally, utilizing a
kind of closure principle to come to know that there is a God will de-
pend on how hard it is to gain knowledge that one interpersonally knows
God.
Finally, consider the role of interpersonal knowledge in testimony.
There is much debate in the testimony literature over the conditions un-
der which one is entitled to trust a testifier; and these considerations ex-
tend to the conditions under which one can acceptably trust the testimony
of strangers (e.g. Lackey : ff.). I submit that there is much to
be gained by including in such assessments whether, and how well, one
knows interpersonally an interlocutor. Surely it can make a difference to
how entitled one is to accept someone’s testimony whether, and how well,
one personally knows the testifier (indeed, knowing certain persons can
make it obligatory for one to refrain from trusting their testimony). Ad-
ditionally, in many cases, whether one is in a position to come to know
that p when a speaker testifies that p may depend on how well one knows
that speaker. Yet the debates over testimony have been largely conducted
without taking up this issue.
who deploys her view of second-person knowledge in handling the problem of evil.
For example, Closure: Necessarily, if S knows that S knowsi R, competently de-
duces q, and thereby comes to believe that q, while retaining knowledge that S knowsi R
throughout, then S knows that q (cf. Hawthorne : ). In other work, I discuss the
relevance of such principles for scepticism about the existence of other minds.
Lackey (: ch. ) broaches the topic, but portrays any appeal to interpersonal
relationships in testimony as epistemically impotent. If the view I’m aiming at is correct,
then interpersonal knowledge will have an epistemic effect on testimony; and it ought
to, since knowledge has epistemic effects. McMyler () and Faulkner () consider

 Conclusion
Epistemology has been gripped by defining and examining propositional
knowledge. Yet there is another familiar kind of knowledge, which has
been largely neglected in epistemology, and which may be the first knowl-
edge we have in our cognitive development: interpersonal knowledge. I
do not claim to have fully articulated all the relevant contours of such
knowledge here. The present paper takes some crucial first steps toward
an account of interpersonal knowledge, by distinguishing it from other
kinds of knowledge we have of other persons, and by exploring how
interpersonal knowledge can be brought to bear on other philosophical
debates.
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